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LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL. By Huntington Cairns, Balti- 
more, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1949. Pp. xv, 583. 
Huntington Cairns has provided lawyers, judges, and laymen with a 
long-needed guide to the thinking of professional philosophers on the 
perennial problems of the law. I think it safe to say that no better in- 
troduction to the subject has ever been written. Indeed, the book is so 
good that one's chief criticism must be that there is not more of it. Thir- 
teen major philosophers are included-if we accept as valid our author's 
characterization of two literary lawyers (Cicero and Bacon) as major 
philosophers. A good many important philosophical figures are omitted. 
No attempt is-made to convey the philosophical thinking of jurists. The 
problem of integrating or interrelating the thirteen chosen philosophical 
perspectives on law is expressly put aside. What we have, then, is an ex- 
cellent collection of essays expounding the thoughts of thirteen philosophers 
on legal issues. It would be captious to criticize these essays because they 
do not attempt to be something else. 
The first character in Mr. Cairns's pageant of philosophers is Plato. 
"Western jurisprudence" we are told, "has consisted of a series of foot- 
notes to Plato" (p. 76). This, perhaps, is more a statement about the 
making of books than about the development of ideas. Socrates and the 
pre-Socratics could also be comprehensively footnoted if we only had the 
texts to footnote. But in the chapter on Plato, Socrates appears only as a 
defendant in a law suit and as a character in Plato's dialogues. 
A brilliant and sympathetic account of Plato 's views on law and justice 
is marred only at one point by lack of sympathy for Plato's socialized 
morality. After pointing out the close parallels between Plato's and 
Bentham's views on the role of a legal code, Mr. Cairns regretfully com- 
ments that the rational theories of punishment they both profess, based 
on the objectives of deterrence and reform, break down because they 
justify the punishment of innocent persons in cases where such persons 
are believed to be guilty or are generally in need of social overhauling. But 
the fact is that any criminal code devised and administered by fallible 
creatures is likely to involve the punishment of some innnocent people who 
are mistaken for criminals. Such occurrences would not, to Plato or to 
Bentham, afford a valid reason for rejecting a legal system as unjust. If, 
in the long run, the system advances human welfare, then the sacrifice of 
some individuals for the general welfare may well be viewed as one of the 
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inevitable products of human finitude. To view such cases as marking a 
breakdown of Plato's and Bentham's social approach is to introduce a very 
different concept of individualistic justice, which Mr. Cairns might well 
defend but which, instead, he assumes without argument or question. 
Where Plato and Aristotle seem to diverge in their lines of analysis, 
Mr. Cairns is definitely on Plato's side. This shows itself in an inclination 
to find sensible meanings in Plato's words, even if it becomes necessary to 
give a word like "harmony" a figurative meaning, while an Aristolelian 
sentence is sometimes given a literal construction and dismissed as obvious 
error. Thus, the Aristolelian idea of "measure" in reward and punish- 
ment-one of the great humanizing ideas of western civilization-is dis- 
missed with the rather cavalier comment: "That it was impossible to 
measure the immeasurable apparently did not occur to him" (p. 122). 
Has not the whole progress of western science rested on the development 
of ways of measuring what was once immeasurable, e.g., temperature, light, 
sound, and energy? And is there no hope that the humanitarian applica- 
tion of Bentham's hedonic calculus, which provided a basis for most of the 
legal reforms of the past century, can be pressed further as we learn more 
about the nature of reward and punishment, or more generally, of human 
enjoyment and suffering? 
Mr. Cairns's effort o prove that Cicero was a philosopher with an origi- 
nal contribution to legal philosophy (p. 130) is not particularly convinicing. 
The assignment of originality to any author generally tells us more about 
the limitations of the assignor than about the achievements of the assignee. 
In this case the ascription of Ciceronian and Hellenistic origins to the basic 
idea of human equality appears to be based upon unawareness of the pre- 
Hellenic development of this thought in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, and 
especially in the prophetic works of Isaiah, Amos, and Malachi. 
With Francis Bacon, as with Cicero, Huntington Cairns does his best to 
make a philosopher of a lawyer, but the effort is not very convincing. 
The chapters presenting the legal philosophies of St. Thomas, Hobbes, 
Spinoza, Locke, and Leibniz are among the most illuminating chapters of 
the volume. 
The account of Thomistic legal philosophy is especially noteworthy be- 
cause, in recognizing that St. Thomas presented "the first systematically 
complete philosophy of law" (p. 203), Mr. Cairns does not fall for the usual 
stereotypes which are so often applied to scholastic philosophers. Thus, he 
carefully notes St. Thomas' recognition of "the relativity of human be- 
havior" (p. 182) and points out many ways in which the later thinking of 
Bentham and Von Jhering was anticipated in Thomistic realism. 
The problem of civil liberties and the limits of state power over the lives 
and thoughts of private citizens has, in recent years, brought forth much 
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thinking, and even more writing. What Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke have 
to contribute to our reflection on these issues is presented by Mr. Cairns with 
great clarity. In Hobbes is revealed (with all the charm that distance 
lends) the clarity that runs through the later thinking of Austin and 
Holmes and their followers in modern jurisprudence; out of this clarity 
emerges a realistic view of the evils of war and anarchy which government 
is instituted to circumvent. In Spinoza is revealed the complementary and 
equally realistic (Aristotelian) view of the evils of government itself, which 
Hobbes and some of his modern followers (e.g., Holmes and Frankfurter) 
have rather tended to overlook. Out of Spinoza's realistic recognition of 
the corruptibility of officials, Mr. Cairns traces the rise of the doetrinie of 
civil liberties and restraints on government which, through the mediation 
of Locke, became so powerful a force in the development of American con- 
stitutional theory. 
Leibniz 's contributions to our understanding of legal system, legal 
science and legal education, and Hume's contributions to our understand- 
ing of why men obey and disobey the law, are subjects of two of the most 
original chapters in this volume. 
The concluding chapters are particularly significant not so much for 
what they say about the views of Kant, Fichte and Hegel, which has mostly 
been said before, but for the imaginative way in which Mr. Cairns has 
identified the echoes of their thoughts in the thinking of our courts and 
legislatures. 
Mr. Cairns has done a beautiful job of translating the words of his 
chosen philosophers from Greek, Latin and German into English. This 
reviewer is not part of the audience which the author has in mind when he 
says, for example, that his obligations to the translations and commentaries 
of England, Grote, Shorey, Taylor, Nettleship and Ritter will be "obvious". 
But two all-too-popular mistranslations deserve correction. So far as I 
know, Aristotle never said that man is a social animal (p. 377). He did 
say that man is a political animal,' which has rather different overtones and 
implications. And Kant did not say that the legislator must be "rationally 
viewed as just and holy" (p. 45), although these are the words of Hastie's 
bowdlerized translation.2 What Kant said was simply that the legislator 
is holy ("der Gezetzgeber ist heitig"), a statement which goes far to explain 
why Kantian legal philosophy (in its unadulterated form) has made so 
little appeal to realistic-minded Americans and their British cousins. 
That Mr. Cairns should have felt bound to end his volume with Hegel 
provides food for thought. "Jurisprudence," we are told, "which was at 
one time the daughter of philosophy, is now not even a stepchild" (p. 567). 
1 Pol. I, 2, 1253a. 
2 Science of Right, Part II (Public Right), see. 49E, in Kant's Philosophy of 
Law (tr. by Hastie, 1887). 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.176 on Tue, 28 May 2013 15:33:12 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
578 FELIX S. COHEN 
Whether the lady in question was murdered or orphaned, Mr. Cairns does 
not say. But whatever the explanation, the fact remains that for almost a 
century after the publication of Hegel's Grundlinien der Philosophie des 
Bechts (1821) very little attention was paid by professional philosophers to 
the perennial problems of the law on which all major philosophers from 
Socrates to Bentham and Hegel (with the possible exception of Descartes) 
had centered a large part of their thinking. 
One of the founders of this Journal undertook to trace, some forty years 
ago,3 the intellectual currents which diverted philosophy from its early and 
long-sustained concern with law and fixed its gaze on more celestial sub- 
jects, such as epistemology, ontology, axiology, and semantics. Among 
those currents, the rock of specialization has exercised a dominant influence. 
Since the years of Hegel's youth, jurisprudence (like physical science) has 
developed into a considerable body of specialized thinking. The mastery 
of its literature stands as a forbidding obstacle to the professional philoso- 
pher who would think philosophically about legal issues. It is much easier 
for the modern philosopher to make a specialty of things that nobody else 
knows much about, such as the nature of knowledge, value, or the universe, 
and to say, "We, too, have a specialty, on which we can speak without 
challenge from the uninitiated. "
Some day, we may hope, a sequel to this volume may be written, perhaps 
by Mr. Cairns himself, to trace contributions to our understanding of the 
law that have come from post-Hegelian philosophers who have refused to 
exclude law from the field of philosophical vision. That it is possible to 
master the literature of jurisprudence without succumbing to jurisprud- 
ential provincialisms and without losing one's philosophic vision or logical 
acumen is shown by the work of Huntington Cairns himself, not less than 
by the work of Morris R. Cohen and T. V. Smith. 
As is the custom among historians of philosophy, Mr. Cairns has por- 
trayed a series of thirteen different views and "put aside immediately the 
attractive thought that the fundamental truths of the various philosophies 
of law should be sifted out and then combined into one harmonious whole" 
(p. 557). The result is to leave the reader with the impression that no 
progress is possible in philosophy, and that all philosophers are in perpetual 
and hopeless disagreement with each other. This dreary conclusion is 
implicit in Mr. Cairns' summary: 
We have been told by Plato that law is a form of social control, an instru- 
ment of the good life, the way to the discovery of reality, the true reality of 
the social structure; by Aristotle that it is a rule of conduct, a contract, an 
3 M. R. Cohen, "The Conception of Philosophy in Recent Discussion," Journal 
of Philosophy, VII (1910), 401; "Jurisprudence as a Philosophical Discipline," 
ibid., X (1913), 225. The former article has recently been reprinted in M. R. Cohen, 
Studies in Philosophy and Science (Henry Holt, 1949), 33-47. The latter is being 
reprinted in a volume of Studies in Juristic Philosophy now in course of publication 
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ideal of reason, a rule of decision, a form of order; by Cicero that it is the 
agreement of reason and nature, the distinction between the just and the 
unjust, a command or prohibition; by Aquinas that it is an ordinance of 
reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, 
and promulgated; by Bacon that certainty is the prime necessity of law; by 
Hobbes that law is the command of the sovereign; by Spinoza that it is a 
plan of life; by Leibniz that its character is determined by the structure of 
society; by Locke that it is a norm established by the commonwealth; by 
Hume that it is a body of precepts; by Kant that it is a harmonizing of wills 
by means of universal rules in the interests of freedom; by Fichte that it is 
a relation between human beings; by Hegel that it is an unfolding or realiz- 
ing of the idea of right (p. 556). 
But why assume that any two of the foregoing statements contradict 
each other? If Aristotle ever said, "It is raining, " and if Hegel ever said, 
"It is not raining," one could establish a contradiction only by reifying the 
"It" in each statement and assuming that there is a single and absolute 
"It" in the universe. May we not more reasonably assume that the field 
of legal activities and legal ideals is sufficiently broad and diversified so that 
law may be a "form of social control " and a "rule of conduct " and a "re- 
lation between human beings," all at the same time? And may we not go 
further and note that from different historical perspectives, different as- 
pects of the field will come into focus and different points of heaven will 
appear at the zenith? Is Hobbes's explanation of the ways in which civil 
war and disorder may be avoided really incompatible with Spinoza's ex- 
planation of the conditions under which civil liberties may be enjoyed? 
May not progress in philosophy, like progress in chess or music, consist in 
the continued elaboration of hitherto unseen possibilities? 
We are, each of us, bound to choose our own definitions and standpoints, 
and to see the world through our own eyes. But may we not, at the same 
time, make allowance for the fact that the rest of the world, poor souls, will 
have to see the world through other eyes and from other standpoints, in 
respect of space, time, and valuation? Logical contradiction can exist only 
within a single system of definitions. One philosopher could contradict 
another philosopher only if he first accepted all the latter's definitions. I 
do not think Mr. Cairns has established that any two of his chosen philoso- 
phers have agreed on all their definitions. It follows that he has not estab- 
lished any logical contradiction among the views that he characterizes as 
contradictory. 
We are all blind men reporting on an elephant, and if each reporter, 
instead of contradicting his fellows, would carefully note the point and 
direction of his own approach, we might piece together a good over-all idea 
of the size and shape of the beast. Perhaps, some day, Huntington Cairns 
will work out the formulae of translation that will help us piece together 
his thirteen reports on the Elephant called Law. 
Felix S. Cohen 
Washington, D. C. 
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